

## **W.A.v.Schlippenbach's Army of Livland**

by

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**(Translation - Dan Schorr)**

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[Translators Note: Sjögren is a very difficult writer to translate. He writes in a very complicated style. As a result this translation is awkward. For this I apologize.]

As a result of the Russian General Staff's ongoing, great work on the History of Peter I, and the basic work done by later Russian historians, such as Ustrjaloff, Solovjev and others, the history of the demise of the Swedish world in the Baltic provinces has, so to speak, been placed on the agenda. In Sweden it has long been overlooked. Attention has been focused in no small degree on the little army, which under W.A.v. Schlippenbach fought and went down in the defense of Livland. For information on this army we have in Sweden first class material, namely the field archives of W.A.v. Schlippenbach, which belongs to Riksarkiv's military history collection. The archives cover the period from the summer of 1701 through the first half of 1707, and together cover at least 5,000 documents (mostly letters from over 200 persons and authorities). This author wishes with this effort to bring this collection's presence and value to other researchers.

During the time before the outbreak of the Great Northern War, Wolmar Anton v. Schlippenbach had gone through times with both a good and a bad reputation. Involved in the Patkul agitation during the reign of Karl XI, he had cleared himself with various defenses, and eventually succeeded in winning the confidence of not only the Queen Mother, Hedvig Eleonora (to which he often turned with letters during the war, at times with good consequences 1), but also the Crown Prince, the future King Karl XII. Particularly with respect to this history it was the well-known Major General C.J. Stuart who as a member of the entourage of Karl, who recommended him. Schlippenbach manifested zeal and industry at the outbreak of war. In April 1700 he raised and maintained, for the most part at his own expense, a dragoon regiment, which from the beginning distinguished itself and was always kept in good order 2. With the exploit at Ismen in October 1700; the expedition to Petsjory in February 1701; and thereafter, through raids over the Russian border in March and April, Schlippenbach brought promising attention to himself and his regiment.

One finds that Karl XII can be regarded as having made a good selection when he named Schlippenbach as commander of the forces left behind for the defense of Livland when the main army marched off for Riga. In a letter of 17 June C.J. Stuart congratulated his "dear brother on the glorious and beautiful expeditions, which he in the past wintry year undertook with his regiment." He was delighted over "so much more", he expressed himself, "as His Majesty could see as a result that what I, on my dear brother's behalf, described was not a made up work." In the same letter Stuart gave the Livland Army's constitution: "His Royal Majesty heads to the Düna with 24,000 men and leaves on the

border 6,000 men, so that everything with God's help can be contested, that by the fall something considerable must be done."

The field troops, which under Schlippenbach's immediate command were designated for Livland's defense, had the following composition:

Cavalry. Somewhat more than half of the Åbo läns regemente: Lieutenant Colonel G. Enschild. The greater part of the Karelska regemente: Colonel M. Wrangel, soon replaced by Lieutenant Colonel H.v. Burghausen.

Dragoons. Schlippenbachs dragonregemente: Lieutenant Colonel A.J.v. Kaulbars. Livländsk dragonskvadron: Lieutenant Colonel A.J.v. Schlippenbach.

Infantry. De la Gardies bataljon: Lieutenant Colonel A.C. de la Gardie. Liwens bataljon: Lieutenant Colonel H.H.v. Liwen 3. Stackelbergs bataljon: Lieutenant Colonel C.A. Stackelberg.

These troops with which Schlippenbach would attempt to operate defensively in the open field were openly few in number. Exact rolls over their strength at this time, when he assumed command, the author has not seen, but from various sources and evaluations in letters from this and later times we can calculate a rough estimate, which is as follows:

The Finnish cavalry regiments during this time numbered regularly 750 men each and ought to have had this number in the beginning	1,500 men
Schlippenbachs dragonregemente (often at full strength)	600 men
Livländska dragonskvadron (highest)	200 men
Three infantry battalions, authorized 400 men each, but seldom reached over 250 men each	800 men
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	<b>TOTAL 3,100men</b>

In addition there were the garrisons in Dorpat and Marienburg, which likewise were placed under Schlippenbach's command. Those in Dorpat regularly reached around 2,000 men. They consisted mainly of K.G. Skyttes infanteriregemente (approximately 1,000 men), M.G.v. Tiesenhausens kavalleriregemente (approximately 700 men), A. Zoges dragonbataljon (200 men) together with Mecks artilleriregemente (approximately 300 men). At times additional larger and smaller units were part of the garrison. In addition in the shipyard at the mouth of the Embach there was a small naval squadron, which consisted of a large vessel (Elefanten) with 10 cannon, together with a yacht with 4 cannon and 4 smaller sloops. The combined crews of these vessels totaled around 300

men, mostly Finns. The commander was Captain M. Hökflycht 5 who was under the command of Vice Admiral G.v. Numers, but who was also commanded to "communicate with the land commanders headquarters", and also in a great number of cases he had to turn to Schlippenbach and obey him. A small garrison was placed in Marienburg, which in the beginning consisted of 150 men under the command of Major F. Thilaw. As reinforcement, a squadron of the Öselska dragoon under the command of Lieutenant Colonel J.H.Brandt 6 was based at Marienburg. Even these troops were under Schlippenbach's command.

As reserve and recruiting material, the levied land militia could be included as an additional resource for the defense of the Baltic provinces. These were a kind of farmer reserve, which were organized by county officials, estate owners and those leasing crown lands, together with contributions from the citizen militia of the cities and towns. Shortly after the beginning of the war, the Governor General on the King's order issued a proclamation calling for a general levy. Further Royal approval was issued in May 1701 from Headquarters at Lais. The Land Militia consisted of a battalion from each administrative district in which Livland and Estland were divided. They served on foot, as well as mounted, and in this way could be used for dragoon service. Battalions were divided into companies, 50 men strong. They could be combined or through enlistment be expanded to a regiment, often 500-600 men strong. One Estland land militia regiment under Colonel W.H. Hastfer belonged to the troop strength, which stood under the command of the Commandant of Narva, H.R. Horn. They remained at the border for Estland's defense, but cooperated a few times with Schlippenbach by means of sending out small help corps.

Schlippenbach had in his defensive position important missions in several areas. Foremost, he was required to protect the border together with the magazines and supply areas, which were found along it. This demanded continuous vigilance. The Russian Cossack swarms in large and small groups continuously conducted their raids, and in doing so they drove their devastation forward, often doing great damage. In the far north in cooperation with the forces in Estland he had to watch the border at Vasknarva (where the Narva River empties from Peipus) and at the same time give special attention further down Peipus to the districts of Aja and Allaskivi where magazines were found. Further south he had to provide for the protection of the easily passable channel at Ismen, which connected Peipus and Lake Pleskov. Here is land forces cooperated with Hökflycht's squadron. Not far from here was the town of Rappin (7 Swedish miles from Dorpat) on the Vibosco River that empties into the Lake Pleskov. This location was an important defensive position and was the location of one of the army's magazines. Here one had to hold oneself ready to meet an incursion which the Russians could do on land from Petsjory (Pitschur), where a patch of their territory went up along the western shore of Lake Pleskov. Further south near the border was Kasaritz where several roads met, one led to Rappin and Dorpat, and another to Rauga, Kirrumpä and Marienburg. Thus, Schlippenbach had to spread his forces in these positions. Usually, these postings were around 200 men strong. They were required as best as they could manage to maintain communications with each other and headquarters. Now and then they pursued the

defeated enemy into his own land. Similarly, incursions over the Russian border had to undertaken now and again in reconnaissance.

In addition, Schlippenbach had to maintain strong protection for Dorpat and Marienburg. In this regard he was also affected, especially where it concerned Dorpat, by Governor General Erik Dahlberg 7, who in the beginning tried to exert control over the Livland Army. West of Dorpat a few [Swedish] miles Schlippenbach's Dragoon Regiment had its station around Erestfer and Sagnitz. Dorpat's castle was a supply base, however quite poorly supplied with ammunition and other war material. The Commandant there since 1697 was Colonel K.G. Skytte. Acting as his deputy was Vice Commandant And. Zöge together with M.G.Tiesenhausen. In Marienburg, where Schlippenbach had his headquarters at the time he took over command, there was a magazine that was also not well supplied. How well this town needed protection, one soon found out. Already in the middle of July, a Cossack force of 500 men crossed the border. It soon received further reinforcements. Three companies of Schlippenbach's Dragoon Regiment were order there. The Russians succeeded in attacking and breaking one of them, but since further support arrived from the Finnish cavalry, the enemy was driven back with loss 8.

It was important for Schlippenbach to select a secure and well-located place for his headquarters, as well as place at least where he could draw together his main force. Since Karl XII with the Swedish Army left the border of Livland, it was apparent that Marienburg was too exposed and too far from Dorpat. Therefore, the headquarters was moved to Kirrumpä. This town was located further inland closer to the source of the River Vibosco; it was surrounded in the north and east by water obstacles, and was fairly well protected by nature. The Åbo läns regemente and De la Gardies bataljon were already based there. The Karelska regemente (based around Rauga) and Stackelbergs bataljon were also relocated to this area. H.H.v. Liwens with his infantry, reinforced with a few cavalry, was positioned closer to the border.

At the same time Schlippenbach had new concerns with the occasion of the permanent and growing Russian fleet on Lake Peipus. To reinforce Hökflycht, Major C.W. Stackelberg with two companies of Estland dragoons was sent. On the island of Porka 40 Russian vessels were driven back, and thereafter a landing was made on the Russian shore where a few villages were set on fire and an enemy force was repulsed 9. Hökflycht returned to the mouth of the Embach, and Stackelberg posted himself at Ismen in order to "inconvenience and alarm the enemy".

The Russian military forces had their two large, main camps at Pleskov and Novgorod. Each of them had their own shipyards; the former at Lake Pleskov and the latter at the mouth of the Wolchows. Each of them also had their own fortified outposts; the former had Petsjory and the latter Augdov. The last named town, which was well fortified and had a garrison of 2,000 men, was, as a matter of fact, in communication with both Pleskov and Novgorod. From there, the Russians could not only threaten Ingermanland, but also enter Estland and Livland over Vasknarva, partly on land over Vasknava and partly from the lakeside with their vessels. Here stood as border guards a post of 200 men from Hastfers regiment detached Estland's dragoons under the command of Major N.de

Molin **10**. Already at the end of July he found his mission impossible to perform and requested reinforcements, which he received, but they were few in number.

In the meantime, Schlippenbach received an additional difficult mission, when Karl XII with the Swedish Main Army (11 August) broke up from the headquarters at Bauzke and advanced to the southern border of Kurland eventually stopping in the vicinity of Grubin (near Libau), and established their headquarters. It was now clear that the planned offensive against Pleskov had been given up **11**, and the Russians could now with their undivided strength attack the troops, which remained in the defense of the Baltic provinces **12**. Slowly one became convinced that the main attack would be directed against Livland. Schlippenbach tried to reinforce himself as best he could, but met difficulties from many directions. From Dorpat he detached a battalion of Skytte's Regiment under Major Meijercrantz to reinforce the weak infantry. But then came a stern letter from Dahlberg, who would not allow Dorpat's garrison to be weakened. One seems to have had to go to the King in order to convince the old Governor General that Schlippenbach really exercised command over this garrison **13**. A squadron of Tiesenhausens kavalleriregemente was also detached from the garrison.

In his way Dahlberg worked, as well as he could, for the army's reinforcement by a new levy of the Livland land militia. On another occasion Schlippenbach turned to Horn **14**. From this advance he was sent the Estländska prästdragonskvadron (raised from the clergy and those leasing crown lands) under the command of Major A.L.v.Rosen. He even wrote directly to Royal Headquarters calling for reinforcements.

With redoubled efforts Schlippenbach was able to complete his border outposts. At Allaskivi stood Major de Molin with 300 men, at Ismen C.W. Stackelberg with his two companies. At Rappin Major A.L.v. Rosen was posted with his 200 dragoons reinforced with 50 musketeers (from Liwen's battalion). On the border opposite Petsjory remained H.H.v. Liwen with 200 musketeers and 50 cavalrymen. At Kasaritz Ryttmäster (Captain) B.Rehbinder was posted with 160 men, and at Rauge Ryttmäster (Captain) O.R. Brusiin (Karelska regemente) with 150 cavalrymen and Captain v. Nolcken with 100 musketeers **15**. Around the headquarters Schlippenbach had the main force of Finnish cavalry, a good part of his dragoons, most of the infantry battalions together with perhaps even some part of the land militia.

At the end of August the Russian Army made ready for invasion. The core of the invasion force, 10,000 men under the old Boris Sjeremetjev, was located around Petsjory. Behind them, closer to Pleskov, the Army's second line organized itself, 16,000 men strong. A selected division made up of three dragoon regiments to which a motley band of kalmucks and tartars were attached was placed under the command of the General's son, Michailo Sjeremetjev. This force was to advance along the western shore of Lake Peipus to Rappin where it was to be reinforced by infantry ferried across the lake. This selected division ought to have had a strength of 5,000 men.

H.H.v Liwen's adventuresome reconnaissance- which this expedition ought to be regarded- has in our historical writings been somewhat exaggerated, so that some space

should be devoted to providing a short account of what actually occurred. On the morning of 27 August Liwen with 300 men crossed the border. First he met an enemy outpost that he succeeded in driving away. But during his further advance, he ran into the enemy's main body, which he estimated at 8,000 men. After a careful reconnaissance, he wanted to withdraw in the direction of Rappin where v. Rosen was positioned. However, he was discovered by the enemy and intercepted at Musicha, two Swedish miles from Rappin. However, during a respite in the action, he sent a warning to v. Rosen. He again became involved in fighting and defended himself manfully until v. Rosen arrived around midday with 100 dragoons. These went quickly to the attack, and disordered the Russians who withdrew. Afterwards, Liwen and v. Rosen returned to their former positions. Schlippenbach was notified about what had occurred and received further intelligence from Marienburg **16**.

The following day v. Rosen received reinforcements from headquarters in the form of 100 Finnish tripleringen [a reference to the method of recruitment], but at the same time received orders to return 50 musketeers. He requested to keep them, "because", he wrote, "the Finns had partly matchlock and partly flintlock muskets, I would prefer that even the 50 musketeers remain here." His request was granted. He renewed his request for additional troops, and received, after great difficulty, a further 200 land militiamen. This group fell for the most part in combat with Michailo Sjeremetjev's army corps on 5 September. A.L.v. Rosen was taken prisoner. Later (1702) he wrote a letter to Schlippenbach from Moscow. In Rappin, where the town was burned and the magazine was ravaged. It seems that Russian justice had run riot. Their own dead were burned in the ignited houses, while the Livland Army's fallen fighters were left unburied in the open fields. It was not until November that efforts were made for their burial **17**.

While 500 went down at Rappin, and a small cavalry action was fought at Kasaritz, Schlippenbach won a complete victory over the core of the Russian Army under Boris Sjeremetjev, some 7,000 men, at Rauge. At Rauge Schlippenbach was able to collect 2,000 men. Success was due in large part to a field fortification of boards and earth constructed under the supervision of O.R. Brusiin around the cemetery in Rauge **18**. Brusiin distinguished himself in the battle. At the Battles of Rauge and Kasaritz, the Russians lost about 2,000 men, according to Kelch. Somewhat less was inflicted on the fleeing enemy masses by the pursuing general levy of farmers and the land militia. Schlippenbach's people were too exhausted to be able to pursue, and had during the long fight certainly suffered losses greater than those given by Kelch.

Lieutenant Colonel Stackelberg was sent to Karl XII's headquarters with a report on the victory and a request for reinforcements. The joy in which the report was received is evident in the two letters sent by Chancellery Secretary Bunge the same day (16 September) to Schlippenbach. In the first letter he congratulates, "the Colonel on the resulting victory against a powerful and numerically superior enemy, and which is not less glorious than the others we have had." It also recognizes that, "the Colonel has a dangerous post and how very necessary it is that this army be strengthened with several regiments so that Livland will be conserved." In the second letter Schlippenbach's promotion to Major General is announced, and with it the hope that he will, " receive a

Lieutenant Generals position so much more quickly, we daily witness this victorious weapon turned against the Russian masses in winter as well as in summer."

The promises of reinforcement were not long delayed. The following troops received orders to join the Livland Army: the majority of the estländska adelsfanan cavalry under Colonel Fritz Wachtmeister, Österbottens infanteriregemente under Colonel J.v. Campenhausen, together with a squadron of E. Stenbock's Dragoon Regiment [Upplands ståndsdragonregemente] under Major Horn. All of these units arrived before the end of the month 19 and were assigned quarters. The normal strength of Wachtmeister's cavalry as reported in a following year was 800 men, and ought to have had a similar strength when they arrived. For Campenhausen's österbottniska regiment there is a specification that also gives a strength of 800 men or a little more. Stenbock's squadron had 200 men. At the end of the year an equally strong squadron of d'Albedyhll's dragonregemente 20 under Lieutenant Colonel C.G.v. Schreiterfeldt was also sent to reinforce Schlippenbach that had been employed at the siege of Dünamünde. The reinforcements sent from the Royal Headquarters came to full 2,000 men.

The Army was also reinforced with land militia. H.R. Horn, to whom Schlippenbach turned, gave an accommodating reply, recognizing that, "the Colonel in consideration of the great force that was advancing against him needed some reinforcement for the action which the enemy would force upon him." From Estland, therefore, B.v. Pahlens landmilisregemente, estimated at 500 men, was dispatched to join the Livland Army. Lieutenant Colonel J. Fr. Lipharts landmilisregemente had an even great number of vacancies; it was supposed to consist of 5 battalions with a command strength of 56 and a manpower strength of around 1,500 21. His brother, Fr. v. Liphart had his own independent command of Tirsenska kretsens lantmilisbataljon, which finally consisted of 350 men in 6 companies 22. More or less complete and useable were a few other land militia battalions, such as Oberpahlenska kretsens lantmilisbataljon under Lieutenant Colonel B.W. Taube, the Wolmarska kretsens lantmilisbataljon under Lieutenant Colonel R.v. Lünow and the Fellinska kretsens lantmilisbataljon under Lieutenant Colonel H.J.v. Buddenbrock. From W.J.v. Tiesenhausens värvade infanteribataljon a company under the command of Captain E.v.Dahlen was transferred to Schlippenbach. These troops were mostly used for guard duty at Dorpat and Marienburg, or other posts.

B.v.Pahlens's regiment was designated for garrison duty in Dorpat. The brothers Liphart were based with their men in the area around Marienburg. The post at Rauga was drawn in. Instead, Captain E.v.Dahlen and his company were posted between Marienburg and Neuhoof. Lieutenant Colonel G.W.v. Yxhull was persuaded by Schlippenbach to set up and maintain a volunteer corps of 250 musketeers 23 on his estate at Menzen to watch the southern border furthest down. Already at the end of September the Russians began to enter the area around Marienburg, which resulted in many hard fights.

In a letter dated 14 September Dahlberg expressed his uneasiness over Dorpat's "provision against all feared enemy assaults," and at the same time urged Schlippenbach to make all efforts "to ensure that in all his actions Dorpat would not be endangered or exposed." Shortly after receiving this letter, Schlippenbach went himself to Dorpat where

he remained the remainder of September and the first days of October. Headquarters was moved in the meantime from Kirrumpä to Erestfer, about 5 Swedish miles behind Dorpat. In the area the main body of the army was quartered, especially the infantry battalions, and Campenhausen's Regiment a short distance away at Kergel. Schlippenbach's dragonregemente was no longer based at its old quarters. A part of the regiment had remained at Marienburg and the remainder was transferred to Pernau to work on the fortifications. The Army's three cavalry regiments and Stenbock's dragoons were moved to the area around the Headquarters.

One was prepared early for a new Russian attack around the end of the year, but more uncertain was from what direction the main attack would come. From Menzen at the end of October Yxkull insisted that the Russians would attack Marienburg with 40,000 men. From Marienburg J.H. Brandt, who was usually well informed, reported on 1 December that the force set aside for the invasion numbered 10,000 men whose advance troops were those who were already conducting raids. These increased more and more and finally resulted in a fortified camp at Luban. Here, Fr.v.Liphart had a difficult time maintaining himself, but was relieved by Brandt and inflicted a defeat on the Russians. "We thank God", wrote Brandt on 17 December, "that we were able to repulse such a large number with our limited manpower." In other areas the enemy showed itself hardly less threatening already at the beginning of fall. At Vasknarva where on the Russia shore fortifications were raised, Cossacks crossed the border in large numbers. Here Major H.Hastfer was temporarily located with only 120 men. Schlippenbach sent Lieutenant Colonel B.W. Taube with 270 men and 4 cannon. In addition, Hökflycht was ordered to Vasknarva with his squadron and to provide support from the lake as long as the waters remained open. Nevertheless, the Russians expanded their raids even to the area around Dorpat. Colonel Hastfer demanded reinforcements of Schlippenbach who sent Major M.v. Brömsen with 100 men of the livländska landdragonerna to maintain communications with the city. At Kaster Brömsen found everything destroyed (14 November). He himself with some reinforcements undertook a raid across the Russian border 24. That the main attack would be directed against Headquarters and with a greater strength than J.H. Brandt had predicted, one would soon experience.

Already at this time, when luck was still with the Livland Army, the severely impoverished land was in such distress that it naturally followed that the troops to a high degree were also affected. Governor General De la Gardie complained in his letter 25 how the peasants suffered from the repeated marches and have been "for the most part driven off because they are emaciated," yes, "great desolation is found." The quartering of troops, especially on leased royal estates, was so oppressive that up to 50 to 60 cavalrymen could be quartered at the same place. Artillery Major J. Kynnairdh 26 in Dorpat, who supervised the "arkliet", sympathized especially with the distress of the men. He wrote to Dahlberg about artillery train personnel who deserted, "The reason for their desertion has been that they have become completely naked and destitute. They do not have a shirt on their back or shoes on their feet, and could not endure the coming cold." War Commissary Brådh wrote to Schlippenbach: "It is impossible for me to provide for the Army as I would like and ought to." The Army's economy was from the beginning very worrisome.

Even the regular troops, who were in first place to have their needs satisfied, often suffered from hard times. On the condition in his regiment Colonel Tiesenhausen wrote: "The men are completely without uniforms, so that when the winter and cold comes, they will not be able to do the King's service, and besides there are few officers with the regiment." Enschild, commander of the Åbo läns regemente, wrote that his people, "did not have anything for meat except salted fish, but nothing to drink, but had to make do with the salted meal and therefore drink water," so that, "the some of the men have already fallen ill and besides have to, like the horses, exist out under the open sky in hard cold weather which this time has become." H. Hastfer described the artillery personnel which were sent to him as reinforcements as in such miserable condition the, "the men have almost no outer or under clothes and in addition wore almost completely worn out shoes, yes, almost half have nothing to wear." From Dorpat, Kynnairdh complained about, "the poor soldiers worn out condition, in that they are without shoes and stockings." In a couple of letters he provided specifications on old flintlock weapons that could "with limited cost be issued to the land militia." 27

Discomfort was increased as a result of quarreling among themselves, which already existed in the council and later further increased among the officers, not the least in Dorpat. Kynnairdh had strained relations with a number of people, particularly with Vice Commandant Zöge. Skytte disliked Colonel Tiesenhausen, and even Schlippenbach himself treated Skytte with aversion. One cannot help getting the impression that the inner council was basically divided along national differences into partisan groups. Time after time one finds that those who wrote in German were unfriendly to those who wrote in Swedish. Schlippenbach tried as arbitrator to maintain harmony with authority, but it could be noticed that he place himself on the side of his German Baltic brothers and intervened with advantage for them.

The Battle of Erestfer, 30 December 1701 consisted the ominous turning point in the Livland's Army's short history. That Schlippenbach did not, as is maintained, allow himself to be surprised as a result of his carelessness during the Christmas celebrations, is clearly evident in his own relation and the field archives incoming correspondence. He had good time before and during the battle to assemble his forces that were located around the headquarters. That Campenhausen with his regiment arrived to late, was due to the fact that the orderly who was sent to the regiment's quarters at Kergel took the wrong road and therefore was delayed.

On the strength of the Livland Army during the battle, there are different states. From each side one has tried to exaggerate the opponents's strength and minimize their own. Schlippenbach himself in his account has provided a specification, which one even with the aid of the field archive's documents cannot verify, but only comment on. When R.v.Liewen's cavalry (Estniska Adelsfanan) were driven back, it is related, Schlippenbach assembled, "Skyttes, Liwens and Stackelbergs battalions, as well as the Åbo läns and Estländska cavalry which together with the Karelska cavalry and Stenbocks dragoons numbered approximately 1,500 men (after so many troops had been detached to other posts). We have specifications for the cavalry regiments for the time just before the battle. From them we know that the Åbo läns regemente had 670 men, the Karelska

regemente 700 men, Estländska cavalry 600 men **28** from which must be subtracted R.v.Liewen's 300 men, leaving around 300. The cavalry's strength equaled close to 1,600 men (if Liewen's cavalry and other detached troops are not considered). If one estimates after full calculation Stenbock's dragoons at 150 men and the three infantry battalions at 750 men, so there are another 900 men for a total of 2,500 men. Consequently, 1,000 men were detached which is hardly plausible. More plausible is that Schlippenbach's figure of 1,500 men is a minimum figure, which he with his "approximation" gives us the right to raise somewhat, and like Kelch, accept at least 1,600 men. Higher increases one can hardly allow. One has to include, regardless of detachments, the large number of sick and unequipped \*which Schlippenbach found reasonable not to make public). To this number one must add the large number of R.v.Liewen's cavalry which fell at the beginning and De la Gardies battalion, which when the battle was beginning was posted to a place which was out of the way which afterwards was found not to be dangerous. If one estimates this battalion at 300 men, one gets a further 600 men. As a result one can quite certainly arrive at a figure of 2,200 men available just before the beginning of the action - approximately the same strength that Schlippenbach had at the Battle of Rauge.

Schlippenbach places his losses in the battle at "approximately 500-600 men", Kelch stretches it to "600-700 men". The figure in any case is too low and could well be increased to 1,000 men - half of the fighting army's total number. Stackelberg's infantry battalion was almost completely destroyed. Liewen's and Skytte's were in extremely poor condition **29**. The infantry losses can certainly not have been less than 500 men. At least a large loss was the loss in the cavalry and dragoons. In the worst condition was the Karelska cavalry regiment; in the beginning of 1702 it numbered only 50 men under the command of Major Löschern. Åbo läns cavalry regiment lost its Colonel, G. Enschöld **30**, who was taken prisoner, its Lieutenant Colonel, H.J. Schauman, Major H.J.v. Liewen together with a pair of ryttmästare (captains). The regiment must have suffered a tremendous loss of manpower. Not the least the Estländska adelsfanan must have suffered. R.v. Liewen died or was taken prisoner before the battle, and of his 300 men few were left when they found refuge at the regimental quarters, but the regiment even took a considerable and certainly loss causing part in the whole battle. Stenbock's dragoons, who were completely surrounded, only just fought their way through naturally with high losses. Under such circumstances the cavalry and dragoon's losses could hardly have been less than those of the infantry, if the latter were proportionally less.

When Campenhausen's regiment, which was in good condition and counted 800 men, arrived late at Erestfer night at night after the battle had ended, the infantry's losses were replaced with fresh troops. Schlippenbach had withdrawn to Sagnitz. There he brought order to the disorganized cavalry and assembled the remaining infantry. There he found himself closer to Dorpat and on the flank of the enemy. To there Campenhausen marched the following day. Schlippenbach was once again ready for battle. He could in addition detach troops from Dorpat and pull in reinforcements from other places. Sjeremetjev therefore found it advisable to pull back since he had devastated the area around Erestfer and sent raiding parties north along the shore of Lake Peipus. The Battle of Erestfer was not actually a defeat for the Livland Army, but resulted in very considerable losses, and

the following reorganization resulted in great changes, which were to give the army an entirely different character.

Headquarters was moved to Sagnitz and remained there. In January 1702 Sjeremetjev's raiding corps were still sent out, and the Russians went even from Augdov over the ice on Peipus. They attacked Allaskivi and from there spread their destruction forward. But in a short time a long thaw set in and as a result the ice on Peipus became unsafe and the raiding parties fell back. One got a breathing space in which to take care of the army's badly needed reorganization and strengthening. Schlippenbach exchanged letters frequently on these subjects with the Royal Headquarters and the parties concerned in Stockholm together with the Governor Generals in Riga and Reval 31. On Royal orders both Governor Generals issued proclamations that ordered that, "all nobles, lease-holders, district officials, and other servants without delay to mount up and join the army." The execution of these orders went as well as expected. Probably Dahlberg arranged even a new conscription of land militia in Livland. He placed Lieutenant Colonel H.G. Buddenbrock with his squadron of Livländska lantdragonerna that were quartered in Kokenhausen under Schlippenbach's command. These were placed at Walck not far from headquarters. Likewise a squadron of the Livländska adelsfanan under Lieutenant Colonel Brakel was transferred to the Livland Army. 32

With all energy recruiting was pursued for both Finnish cavalry regiments that were in such poor condition following Erestfer. Ryttmästare (Captains) Chr. Freundenfelt and O.R. Brusiin were sent to Viborg, and B.Rehbinder and J.H. de la Motte were sent to Åbo. Even Headquarters got in immediate contact with both of the provincial governments in Viborg and Åbo 33. The difficulties with which the recruiting effort ran into can be seen in a letter from B. Rehbinder already from the end of the year (Åbo 23 November). "Willing I", he wrote, "according to the responsibility of my duty tried to obtain good manpower as well as good horses for His Majesty's most pressing service; however, in this district there is very little of both types, especially manpower, such that on a few rusthåll (farmsteads supporting cavalry) there is found only the master himself, usually an old man, of whom few are suitable for His Majesty's service. But as here both in Åbo and other small towns a number of drifters and similar citizens can be found, who are so poor that they cannot pay their taxes, that I have requested of the provincial governor that I be allowed to procure them for cavalymen for the rusthåll which in no other way themselves could provide the men. But the answer was, that any such men that could be found must be used as soldiers for the rotar (farmsteads supporting infantry) which were completely deserted and where no male could be found. Any excess to the infantry requirement would be provided to the cavalry." Naturally, the difficulties only increased when new recruiting had to undertaken at the beginning of 1702.

Even in the area of enlistments one tried to widen the army's reinforcement. Lieutenant Colonel H.G.v. Buddenbrok promised already at the beginning of the year to increase the livländska dragonskvadron to 400 men and therefore make the beginnings of a regiment. His second in command, Major M.v. Brömsen, afterwards the fallen hero of Dorpat, like Marqvard became the fallen hero of Narva, took on himself to raise three new dragoon companies for which men would be taken from the land militia. As Lieutenant Colonel he

shortly took over command of these troops that likewise were intended to be a regiment **34**. His people were posted as reinforcements to the garrison of Dorpat.

The three "ruined" infantry battalions for the most part were to be filled up through recruitment from the land militia. According to a special Royal proclamation this was to be the case with H.H.v. Liwens battalion that already was a question on expanding to a regiment. In order to help provide better equipment and arms, it was to be posted to Pernau **35**. De la Gardie's battalion, which escaped unhurt, was quartered at Fellin, not far from headquarters.

The procurement of weapons for the army went forward without any particular hindrances. Schlippenbach had experienced a shortage of artillery at Erestfer. It was the Russian's 30 large and well-aimed cannon that in the last resort had decided the battle. Schlippenbach's small battery of "2 pair of regimental pieces and 2 iron 3-pounder pieces," were for the most part taken by the enemy. He now turned to Governor General De la Gardie with an inquiry on the amount of cannon, muskets and pistols which could be done without in Reval. The answer was, when it concerned cannon, that none could be done without, but that a letter had gone to the War College with a request to fill the need from Sweden. The War College's answer was that according to Royal orders, " 60 3-pounder and 30 6-pounder iron pieces should be sent to Riga," from which Schlippenbach could ask for what he needed. Other weapon needs were made good from small shipments from several different locations. **36**

Great difficulties were met in the procurement of necessary uniform items for the men. Schlippenbach wrote, " the army is beginning to become quite threadbare". For foodstuffs and other necessities, as usual there were great shortages, which began to increase even more. On 8 February Schlippenbach held a conference with Governors Strokirch and Strömfelt. They agreed on the following non-rejectable demands: lease holders would deliver a consignment of bread wagons with the associated harnesses, each district official supplies a horse together with the whole country supplying a consignment of shirts and shoes. Governor General De la Gardie protested against the first of these demands. District officials were against providing horses. From each estate was requisitioned eight good shirts or 48 alnar (1 aln=ca 60 cm) of linen together with three pair of leather shoes provided with three strong soles or three karoliner(?) in money. Schlippenbach turned to Strokirch (Governor in Riga) and more to Strömfelt particularly in questions on the army's supply needs **37**. The Provincial Governor on Ösel, E. Mannerberg **38**, received a Royal order on 10 April on the shipping of necessary foodstuffs to Pernau for the army's use. Uniform needs were provided for in smaller lots **39**, first at the end of April the shortage was relieved to a large extent with the help of 16,000 alnar of vadmal from Reval.

Especially important was the reinforcement of the squadron on Lake Peipus, so that one would be somewhat prepared for the enemy's tremendously increased fleet on Peipus which now consisted of half-galleys constructed of pine timber. At the shipyard at Embach two yachts were constructed, Vivat and Carolus XII, each mounting 10-12 cannon, a further two galliot præmer, each mounting 6 cannon together with a mortar ship

which mounted two mortars. Besides a number of old sloops were repaired and some previously captured Russian vessels. Command of this increased naval force was taken over by Commander C.G. Löschern **40** under whom Jonas Hökflycht became second in command. Dahlberg, who retired as Governor General on 26 April, ordered that 66 cannon be sent to Peipus, "there to be employed as armament for the vessels."

As if a premonition of a coming disaster Schlippenbach devoted activity to the fortification of Pernau, which maintained communications with Sweden and in the worst case, could provide sanctuary to the army in flight. He corresponded with the Commandant of the place, Lieutenant Colonel G.v. Schwengeln; and more so he was in communication with fortification's Captain W.G. Läv **41**. To assist in the work there, a large part of Schlippenbach's Dragoon Regiment was detached there.

Schlippenbach was in constant communications with Major H.J. Brandt. He received from him his best intelligence on the enemy's plans and armaments together with information on the complete condition on this much-threatened border. Likewise, he maintained an exchange of letters with Thilaw and the brothers Liphart. To reinforce Marienberg, he sent part of Skytte's regiment. **42**

The Russian plan to direct a major attack against both Livland and Ingermanland in the coming summer was suspect or noticed early. Horn wrote about it from Narva already on 24 March. Schlippenbach took the occasion to submit his need for further reinforcements in a letter to Queen Mother Hedvig Eleonora. This step was not without good effect. The Government in Stockholm decided that four addition Finnish regiments, namely Nylands, Björneborgs, Nylands och Tavastahus and Savolaks, together 4,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry should be assigned to reinforce the Livland Army. There even arrived a Royal order that a new raising of Swedish recruits should as quickly as possible depart for Hapsal and of these 8,000 men were promised to Schlippenbach's army. Now one for once had great hopes. Governor General De la Gardie was especially filled with hope and in his letter of 2 May gave sanguine expression to it. It was assumed the land militia would be brought up to nearly 16,000 men. To this should be added the new recruiting of the old regiments, the expected new ones from Finland, together with the Swedish recruit contingent. Based on this he considered that Schlippenbach by summer would come to "act with an army of 40,000 men". The more thoughtful and skeptical planner Schlippenbach ought to have nevertheless done his calculations based on at least half of the promised strength. But even with this force he considered himself strong enough to choose to attack Pleskov and thereby extract revenge for Erestfer.

However, the castle in the air tumbled down quickly, and even Schlippenbach's modest hopes were bitterly dashed. The land militia, which could bring hope, was few in number, poorly equipped and even worse armed. Schlippenbach complained about this to De la Gardie on 8 June. The latter replied that, "concerning these the situation is unavoidable must remain destitute and unfulfilled, so that for ourselves pure impossibility stands in the way" and think that "the Major General as a rational man realizes that there are outside conditions which no one has the means to compel, should well learn to be content." The Finnish recruiting gave perhaps a more considerable result, but certainly

not close to what was expected 43. The promised new regiments needed to be equipped, and therefore demanded more time. Only a hardly noteworthy fraction arrived while the Livland Army continued to exist; thus 70 men of the Nylands och Tavastahus Regiment were posted to Marienburg. What part Livland got of the promised Swedish recruits, we have not been able to determine; but they were certainly inconsiderable. Schlippenbach requested that De la Gardie (29 May) at least send Colonel M.W. Nieroth and his infantry regiment in garrison in Reval as reinforcement to the Livland Army, "since the enemy with a large force is approaching the border" and Schlippenbach was "furnished with little infantry". The filling of this request was delayed, because the regiment had still not received its uniforms from Stockholm; but a week after these arrived, the regiment departed 44. Some part of the Österbottens regemente probably was detached from Schlippenbach; Campenhausen lay sick in Riga 45, and Lieutenant Colonel J.v. Wadenfelt directed command over the remaining force.

The prelude to Sjeremetjev's third and largest invasion of Livland took place on Peipus and ended with Hökflycht's death, Löschern's defeat and the loss of the shipyard at Embach. This was followed by an advance of an army strength that together reached 40,000 men over Peipus and from Ismen. 17,000 men remained at Petsjory. Schlippenbach was prepared in good time for the enemy invasion, and had made ready with assembling forces to meet it. On 19 July the Battle of Sagnitz and Hummelshof occurred, which destroyed Schlippenbach's Livland Army, and for the Russians laid the groundwork for their conquest of Livland.

On the choice of the position at Hummelshof, Kelch expressed himself with criticism: "The beginning of our quickly following defeat was that one left Sagnitz whose neighborhood, as those with military experience believed, was especially suited for battle and went among the marshy ground at Hummelshof." What we can say 46 in Schlippenbach's defense comes from a pair of letters in his field archive a strange confirmation. He, far from untested, had the time to seek counsel of the "militarily experienced" who were of a higher order than those pastor Kelch had available. He turned to his old patron, then the Swedish Governor in Mitau, C.J. Stuart. His answer is dated 19 July, the same day the battle took place, and not before a good deal of time had past would it have come into Schlippenbach's hands. He took first into consideration how Schlippenbach ought to pull back to Dorpat towards which the heart of the attack was directed, or hold position at Sagnitz and there "let it come to battle". Both alternatives he rejected: "the former", he wrote, "fails by itself since one knows that supply there is so limited"; the latter "seems to be questionable, if it cannot happen without immediate advantage, if one did not have to fear the enemy's large numbers". He provides instead direction on a third selection - the same one that was actually taken. "Because", he wrote, "of my brother's inquiry this is my definite and well-meant answer, that he posts himself at some advantageous pass, where he can prevent the enemy from going further inland, against which he can not advance with all of his force. Should any tightly wooded thicket or marsh be available, and then one should call up all of the farmers in the area to take up all of the bridges and fill in [block] all of the roads. Then I would hope that the enemy's great numbers would be a disadvantage, rather than an advantage." Earlier Schlippenbach himself had gone through the same thought process when he chose the Hummelshof

position. However, the misfortune was partly that the enemy "came with his entire force", and partly that the unusually strong summer heat a considerably dried up the marshes and reduced the water level in the Embach River. In a following letter (6 August) Stuart wrote: " That I approve my brother's conduct, can be seen in my previous letter, wherein I recommended the same which my brother selected...."

Schlippenbach had 17 cannon in the battle; most were of a small caliber. But even this considerably increased battery did not work to his advantage against the enemy's tremendously superior artillery force, which even this time decided the battle. The Russians took the whole battery.

On the strength of the Livland Army in the Battle of Sagnitz and Hummelshof, the sources vary 47, but with some certainty it probably approached 6,000 men. Any information on the strength of the various corps shortly before the battle cannot be found in the field archives; only to a reduced degree can we extract from the many different correspondence material for a probable estimate. As a basis can we to some degree (however with moderation) use M.W. Nieroth's proposed estimate of the combined strength of the military forces in Livland in April 1703. Obviously, it is not grounded on exact knowledge of the situation at the time, but on older traditional conditions, so that to some degree it can pass for the situation at the time of the Battle of Sagnitz. Estimates on the strength of the units that participated in the battle are as follows:

<b>Cavalry</b> Åbolandska rytterireg	700 men
Karelska rytterireg	700 men
Estländska adelsfanan	700 men
Lifländska adelsfanan	400 men
Svenska adelsfanan	200 men
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,700 men</b>

<b>Dragoons</b> Schlippenbachs regemente	600 men
J.A.v Schlippenbachs drag	200 men
Stenbocks	100 men
Buddenbrocks	200 men
N.de Molins	200 men
Albedyhlls	200 men
G.A. Lewenhaupt	200 men

	men
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,700</b>
	<b>men</b>

<b>Infantry</b>	300 men
Nieroths regemente	
De la Gardies bataljon	300 men
Liwens	300 men
Stackelbergs	200 men
Tiesenhausens regemente	200 men
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,300</b>
	<b>men</b>

<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>5,700</b>
	<b>men</b>

In addition one should include some land militia that were probably present **48**, although in small numbers, the estimate reaches 6,000 men, perhaps somewhat more.

Approximately half of the Livland Army was lost during or immediately following the battle. In Schlippenbach's account gives a loss of 840 dead and at least as many captured, thus nearly 2,000 men. A further 1,000 men were probably lost following the defeat as units scattered and broke up. Gordon is right when he maintains, "2,000 Swedes lost their lives and over 1,000 were wounded or captured. Among the fallen were Lieutenant Colonel O.F. Brakel and Major N. de Molin. The remainder of the fleeing cavalry gathered in Pernau. Schlippenbach stopped in Fellin where he remained a week employed in assembling the few remaining, roughly handled infantry **49**. With these he eventually withdrew to Pernau. Mannerburg promised to quickly send foodstuffs to the distressed troops. The troop strength that Schlippenbach succeeded in collecting found itself now in Estland, and formed the basis for an Estland Army. The Livland Army's history had reached its tragic end.

The melancholy final impression is heightened by the death struggle that the detached corps had to suffer during the ongoing barbaric devastation of Livland. To this belongs the fall of Marienburg, the unlucky fate of Menzen's heroic defense together with .J. Brandt's defeat and destruction while on his way to unite with the main force. To what has already been related a couple of additions must be made. Yxkull's final letter to Schlippenbach is dated 6 August. He deplores the fact that " he was left so completely without assistance, through which the sustained defeat was felt much worse", and he expressed his wish that " the court must duly give full satisfaction that we went forward

under Your protection must gloriously fulfill our devotion." Brandt received Schlippenbach's order to remain at Volmar and take over command of the general levy. However, he moved to the battlefield of Sagnitz and Hummelshof where he had the fallen of the Livland Army buried. His last letter to Schlippenbach is dated 13 August. He expressed his fear for the Russian army's penetration to the south, through which possibly "the city of Riga through murderous fire would be given up to Vulcanus." Shortly afterwards he was overpowered and taken prisoner at Volmarshof. Command over the few remaining Öselska dragoons was taken over by Major M. Giging, who wrote from Riga (26 August) that he "in wretched condition arrived from the holding action at Volmarshof."

The Livland's Army was like a cut down tree of which only the stump remained, and in this a powerful ability to grow still existed. The Russian Army's hurried march to Ingermanland gave Schlippenbach time to reorganize. The remaining troops of the defeated army, which numbered at most 3,000 men, assembled at Pernau, from which the headquarters moved to Wesenberg. The main strength consisted of cavalry and dragoons; the infantry was almost completely destroyed. In the beginning of August a transport of foodstuffs from Mannerburg arrived for the suffering troops. This was only of immediate help; more important support had to be sought from the Governors of Riga, Reval and Dorpat. The message that was received from them was not encouraging. From Riga the military commissariat Brådh wrote (8 September): "Here we are so destitute that there is not 1,000 rdr in assets available."

To fill the thin ranks in the army there were naturally found few resources, but one had some to count on. Arriving in Livland were 500 recruits from Åbo and 300 from Nylands. These had arrived too late for the battle, but now were received as needed reinforcements. "Colonel M.W. Nieoth's infantry regiment, originally intended for Reval's defense, was given to Schlippenbach; likewise, the Commandant of Narva relinquished the Jerviska districts land militia regiment under Colonel Otto Rehbinder's command. Still, however, Schlippenbach lacked the infantry that could replace those battalions ruined at Sagnitz. Some help was obtained through the sacrifice of H.H.v. Liwen who not only replaced his battalion, but also expanded it to a regiment. It was a long time also before Schlippenbach was able to replace the artillery which was lost at Sagnitz; in November he was still without cannon, and only at the beginning of the new year was he informed from Reval that a shipment had arrived from Stockholm.

In the new army organization both Finnish cavalry regiments and Schlippenbach's re-raised dragoon regiment the core of the Livland Army was preserved, but around them a completely new Estland Army grew whose history has its own notable chapters.

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1. Schlippenbach's letter to Hedvig Eleonora is found in a special collection at the Riksarkivet.
  2. On this regiment's history see O. Sjögren, *Försvarskriget i Lifland 1701 and 1702*, pages 4-9. Information for the most part is obtained from the Krigsregistraturet

- for 1700 and 1701. The regiment's history ended as Russian prisoners with the daring attempt to break out from Kasan.
3. This is how he spelled his name, while other relatives wrote it as Liewen.
  4. Gadebusch, Liefel. Jahrb. III. Anh, page 150 gives Schlippenbach's field army at "only 3,000 men" and probably comes closest to the truth.
  5. So he writes his own name (otherwise Hökeflycht). During 1701 he sent 15 letters to Schlippenbach. In the letter of 28/6 he provides his strength and requests 2 officers and 1 non-commissioned officer from the garrison in Dorpat. In the letter of 18/6 he reports his instructions (of 5 July) and begs Schlippenbach, "for Gods sake to obtain 50 good Swedish men for the fleet", because he adds, " I cannot operate with these Finns."
  6. F. Thilaw wrote to Sweden during the latter half of 1701 in all 32, J.H. Brandt 36 letters.
  7. Dahlberg sent 50 letters to S. in 1701, the first dated 28/6. The writings start with the words His Royal Majesty and are written in quite reserved tone
  8. Concerning it Thilaw, 5 letters (23-29 July and 9 August). A.J. Kaulbars 3 and 4 August.
  9. Hökflykt's letter (22/6 - 8/9); C.W. Stackelberg (1701) 10 letters of which 3 deal with his cooperation with Hökflykt.
  10. N. de Molin corresponded frequently with Schlippenbach from 13 Sept to the end of the year. He took part in the Battle of Erestfer and was killed at the Battle of Sagnitz.
  11. On Karl XII's intended march on Pleskov, J.H. Bunge wrote in his letter to Sweden of 23 July.
  12. H.R. Horn (22 July) feared that the enemy would "in haste undertake a few furious capital enterprises". Cronhjort believed that the enemy would "undertake something on the Narva." Dahlberg (13 August) reported as certain that "the Muscovites would soon attack Est-,Lif- and Ingermanland and lay waste with fire and sword".
  13. Dahlberg to A. Zöge, 10 August. A. Zöge to S., 13 August. Dahlberg to S., 24 August.
  14. H.R. Horn's first letter to S. is from 22 July. Correspondence between to the two became quite frequent.
  15. Several authors (Lundblad, Sarauw, etc.) have criticized S. for weakening his main army by the many border posts. From the above explanation, however, it is evident that as much as possible he used the auxiliary troops he obtained from Estland for the border posts.
  16. Thilaw, 24 August and 2 Sept. H.J. Rehbinder 2 Sept.
  17. Ryttn. T.v. Bornmann to S. 10 Nov. 1701.
  18. O.R. Brusiin, 3 letters, especially 29 August on the fortifications, "which are particularly well suited for the infantry to fire."
  19. Dahlberg 20 Sept. M.v. Strokirch 23 Sept.
  20. In advance a company of 86 men under Captain M.S. Taube arrived (G.C. Schreiterfeldt 28 Sept.). They were quartered at the coast (M.v. Brömsen, 14 Sept.). Later the main body arrived (A.J. Kaulbars, 7 Dec).

21. Letters from J.Fr. Liphart from 22 Sept to 23 October (besides 5 letters from 1702 and 4 from 1703).
22. Fr.W. Liphart's correspondence with S. begins in Sept. 1701, but the letters for this and the following year are few. After the war he became Colonel and Commandant in Malmö. He retired in 1731 and died in Småland in 1735.
23. On G.W.v. Yxkull see the note of Lossius in Kelck page 288, which cites the Yxkull family archive in castle Fickel and Ustrjaloff, Peter d. Gr. IV. p. 120 and 121.
24. M.v.Brömsen's letter is in direct contradiction to Kelch's information (page 257) that the raid took place on Schlippenbach's order. Despite this Schlippenbach was quite upset and B. had to justify himself in light of the consequences.
25. 13 letters from 1701. See even letters from the beginning of 1702.
26. J. Kynnairdh's 28 letters from 1701.
27. H.v. Tiesenhausen, 5 October. G. Enschild, 1 October. Kynnairdh to Dahlberg, 11 Sept. and 7 October.
28. Specifications for 15 December show for Åbo läns regemente 672, for Karleska 708, for Estländska adelsfanan 626 "other ranks' horses". For the Estländska adelsfanan there is a roll of 21 December wherein manpower including officers and noncommissioned offices is given as 435 present and 178 detached.
29. Liwen (26 March 1702) describes his battalion as "ruined" at Erestfer; the remainder was posted at Fellin. Only a small number of Skytte's battalion remained which were posted at Oberpahlen (Skytte, 13 Jan). A specification of 8 Jan 1702 lists the remainder of Skytte's battalion as 84 men.
30. As a prisoner in Moscow E. wrote to S. a letter 24/6 1703. He was subsequently exchanged against Colonel Alex. Gordon who was captured at Narva and who wrote Peter I's History.
31. Dahlberg in the first four months sent 42 letters. On 26 April he announced his retirement that had been approved on 7 April and the same day he arranged the large shipment of cannon to the Peipus Squadron. From his second in command and successor, C.G. Frölich 87 letters were sent during the year, from De la Gardie 79 letters.
32. From O.F. Brakel 5 letters, all from the first half of May 1702. Besides 2 letters from his second in command, Major G. Horn.
33. Freudenfelt had a standing recruiting mission from the end of 1701 and continuing in the beginning of 1702 (5 letters), he returned to Reval on 25 June. Brusiin received orders 28/1 (2 letters). B. Reh binder has in 3, De la Motte in 5 letters explained their missions. Letters from Governor Lindhjelm in Viborg and Bure in Åbo deal for the most part with recruiting.
34. M.v. Brömsen, 9 March 1702. From this year there are 5 letters from him.
35. H.H.v.Liwen, 26 May.
36. Dahlberg, 8 February, 1,000 flintlock muskets, 500 matchlock muskets, 1,000 cavalry pistols, 1,000 carbines; 15 hundredweight of pistol powder. Pistol smiths, wheel and saddle makers were sent to Dorpat to repair weapons. - Horn, 27 March, sent to Dorpat " 5 metal and 9 iron artillery pieces".
37. From Strokirch Schlippenbach received during this year 36, from Strömfelt 93 letters, the most dealing with army supply and other economic matters. During the

- months of March and April there was sent from Riga to the army quarters in Helmet 618 hundredweight of bread, 777 hundredweight of malt and 2,572 barrels of oats.
38. From E. Mannerburg there are 14 letters from this year.
  39. Dalhberg, 26 February, sends 200 alnar of course linen, "how one can image, that in the area of Dorpat is better after the battle than here." Strömfelt sent uniform articles several times. H.R. Horn, 7 February, sent footwear for the Åbo läns regemente.
  40. C.G. Löschern, 16 letters. Hökflycht enlisted boatmen in Reval, besides 100 men were sent from Karlskrona.
  41. W.G. Läv, 10 letters in the course of 1702. Later Läv (1704) received a testimonial from Schlippenbach, that he "in his defense assumed responsibility for upgrading the completely deteriorated works at Pernau with complete trust and industry for the most part brought to perfection."
  42. From H.J. Brandt not less than 70 letters are found, written Jan.-Aug. 1702. Thilaw send 10, J.Fr.v. Liphart 5 letters. C.G. Skytte, 3 March, complains about the great need his "boys" in Marienburg are suffering. They deserted to Dorpat, but were returned (Skytte, 18 April).
  43. Freundenfelt arrived in Reval in June with 279 cavalymen and 148 horses; the horses were "much exhausted after the difficult passage on the small cargo ships." He received orders that with half of the men to post himself at the "Peipus pass" and the rest to Narva.
  44. M.W. Nieroth wrote 13 letters to Schlippenbach during the year.
  45. Campenhausen went there in April 1702, "to see a surgeon" and engage an "occultist". He died in Riga 1705.
  46. Försvarskriget i Lifland 1701 och 1702, page 48.
  47. Gordon (I, 176) gives after Russian sources 9,000 men, Gadebusch 7,000. When Bergmann (II, 77) gives Swedish losses to "between 1,998 and 5,490 men" probably the latter figure in this widely varying figure is based on what one from the Russian side knew about the army's actual numbers. Gordon says, "the Swedes do not choose to admit that they were well over 5,000 men strong".
  48. Such that B.W. Taube states (23 July) that his Oberpahlenska battalion lost 227 weapons in the battle. That B.v. Techlen's regiment that was stationed in the area took part to some degree in the battle is at the least probable.
  49. De la Gardies battalion, which avoided Erestfer, was now in such poor condition that "it sorely needed rest" the remainder numbered only 37 men (A.J. De la Gardie, 28 July).